The kidnapping of Libya's Prime Minister Ali Zaidan on Thursday 11th October 2013, by a faction of the country's Militia, is put in perspective.
As the New York Times describes it, the unrivalled authority of Libya's militias has seen it literally hold the country hostage "... hampering production of oil, forcing power cuts, participating in gun running- all with impunity".
There is collective agreement that Libya's weak central government does not have the means to rein in the militias as well as deal decisively with its worst excesses.
It should become increasingly clear that in spite of knowledge that Colonel Qaddafi governed his country for 42 years without credible institutions including a police force, this fact was not taken into consideration when a section of the international community backed an intervention that guaranteed his demise.
A much better scenario should perhaps have been to strengthen the opposition militarily, to the extent that Colonel Qaddafi would have no choice but negotiate or face significant erosion of his power.
Given the current circumstances, it is simplistic to merely suggest that getting rid of Colonel Qaddafi guaranteed safety for the citizens of Libya that opposed his rule.
History's take on Libya in the immediate aftermath of the country having been rid of its absolute ruler of 42 years, looks to be that a fundamental mistake was made in the manner of resolution of its 'Arab spring'.
